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Abstract The Indian power system underwent two sep-
arate massive blackouts on 30th and 31st of July 2012.
These blackouts exposed a series of inherent problems
underlying the power system of India, such as its genera-
tion planning, transmission planning, grid infrastructure,
management systems, primary energy resources, environ-
mental constraints, electricity market, and information
technology, which together aggravate the massive black-
outs. These factors which affect the adequacy and security
of the power supply in a similar manner as the transmission
congestion of physical grids does, can be called by a
generic term as generalized congestion. Competitive
manipulations and ‘‘game-playing’’ between various
interested parties further intensifies these congestions.
Here, from the perspective of generalized congestions, the
paper reflects the inevitability of India’s massive blackouts,
discusses occasional effects of trigger events, inherent
evolution law of blackouts and the enlightenment on power
industry in China, and explores risk control measures to
defend blackouts in China. The positive role of strong
smart grid in insuring energy and environment security is
highlighted.
Keywords Energy security, Power congestion, Multi-
domain interaction, Complex system, Domino effect,
Comprehensive defense, Risk control
1 Introduction
At about 2:30 a.m. (Indian Standard Time, IST) on the
30th July, 2012, the 400 kV Bina–Gwalior power line in the
state of Uttar Pradesh in India was tripped. This accident
initiated a cascade of outages and subsequently led to the
collapse of the country’s entire northern grid. The massive
blackout hit New Delhi and nine states (including Madhya
and Uttar Pradesh), affected 370 million people, and forced
35.67 GW of load demand (around 18 % of the total load
demand of India) to be taken offline. During the blackout,
railway systems were shut down, the subway service in New
Delhi was also stopped, and the urban transportation systems
were paralyzed. More severely, the civil water supply was
interrupted and more than 200 miners were trapped under-
ground [1]. The emergency forced the electricity suppliers to
transfer power from eastern and western India and also
purchase additional power from Bhutan. These approaches
quickly restored the power supply. As of 13:00 p.m. and
16:30 p.m. on 30 July 2012, 70 % and 85 % of the load
demand was restored [2].
The next day (31st of July, 2012), the system failed
again at 13:05 p.m. IST. A massive blackout again col-
lapsed the northern grid. In addition, the eastern and
northeastern grids were also affected. Twenty of India’s 28
states were hit and 50 GW of load demand was affected.
Approximately 670 million people (nearly half of the
national population) were without power [3, 4].
These two blackouts are the largest in history regarding
the number of people affected, and produced huge direct
economic losses and profound social impacts. According to
the Planning Commission of the Indian Government, these
blackouts are expected to reduce India’s growth rate by
1.2 % and negatively affect potential foreign investment in
India [4].
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Power Miniser Sushil Kumar Shinde, who was promoted
to Minister of Home Affairs exactly on the day of the
blackout, stated that the long-term overdraw of power by
some states may be responsible for this massive accident.
He, however, did not explain why such severe overdraw
was not prevented. The government investigation report
summarized the causes of the blackouts, which include:
poor grid infrastructure, overloading of interconnection
lines, mal-operations of protection systems, the absence of
authoritative top-level to state-level control, etc. Sugges-
tions were also given by the report to encourage better
coordination between the top and region level controls,
forced primary frequency regulation and effective under-
frequency and under-voltage load shedding, etc. [5].
Similar to India, China is experiencing a rapid economic
growth and facing a series of challenges such as lack of
energy, strong dependence on imported fossil fuels, tran-
sition of economic growth modes, environmental pressures,
as well as rapid changes in electric power, power grids, and
load demand. What can China learn from these events in
India that will help prevent similar events from occurring
in China’s power grids? This attracts attentions of Chinese
researchers from various fields [6–8].
From the perspectives of macroenergy [9] and general-
ized congestions [8], the paper analyzes the causal factors
(inevitable or accidental) underlying these massive black-
outs, and the evolution processes; it also emphasizes the
important role of strong smart grids and the multi-space–
time-scale cooperative blackout-defense system in the risk
reduction for power, energy, and environment systems.
2 India and its energy systems
Currently, India is the tenth largest economy in the
world and the third largest in Asia, following China as one
of the biggest developing countries (along with Brazil).
With booming high technology industries and software out-
sourcing, India has become the ‘‘world’s office’’ and fos-
tered a large high-tech workforce (second only to the
USA). In the past two decades, the gross domestic product
(GDP) of India has grown at an average annual rate of 7 %.
Even during the global financial crisis (2009–2011), the
country still reached a remarkable average annual GDP
growth of 7.8 % [10].
However, without any top-level design, these achieve-
ments have been supported primarily by new technologies,
while traditional industry sectors (e.g., manufacturing) and
infrastructure construction have remained largely undev-
eloped. According to The Global Competitiveness Report
2012–2013, published by the World Economic Forum in
2012, the quality of overall infrastructure of India ranked
87 out of in 144 countries: lower even than Sri Lanka and
Botswana. As reflected by the report, the weak and dated
infrastructure and the longstanding lag in development of
electric power generation and transmission grid in India
has become a bottleneck limiting economic growth. The
severe shortage of power generation capacity has been
causing shortfalls in power and power outages, and the lack
of transmission capacity has been creating power trans-
mission difficulties for existing power stations and also
leading to blackouts caused by failures. The risk of failures
has been increased due to the lack of investment, infor-
mation share and the capability to handle failures limited
by poor on-line precautionary information and control
technologies.
From the perspective of power generation, the capacities
of India and China were similar in the 1960s. In May 2012,
however, the total installed capacity of India (200 GW)
was only around 20 % of that in China [3]. In 2011, the per
capita electricity production of India was only 26.4 % of
the global average. Clearly, this severe power shortage
cannot support balanced regional and economic develop-
ment or sustained growth [11]. Furthermore, it cannot even
insure basic social justice and stability. As an example, in
2011, around 25 % of the population of Indian (6 % of the
urban citizens and 33 % of the rural citizens) had no access
to electricity [11].
From the perspective of power transmission, the lack of
regional interconnection has limited the optimization of
normal operations, and also the efficiency of emergency-
response measures. Without stable water and electricity
supplies, it is difficult to attract foreign investment into
manufacturing industries, thus further limiting the devel-
opment of basic industries and initiating a vicious cycle.
The main energy sources in India are coal (concentrated
in eastern India) and hydropower (primarily in northern
and northeastern India), both ranked fifth in the world. The
per capita energy resources of India are lower than those in
China. Fortunately, a large fraction of the coal fields in
India are suitable for surface mining, and this has translated
into relatively low coal and thus low electricity costs.
However, other complicated issues in this country (e.g.,
environmental protection, land requisition, and game-
playing between interested parties) have limited the effi-
ciency of coal mining. As a result, approximately 10 % of
the power generation capacities have been left idle because
of coal shortage [3]. Other electric power in India is gen-
erated from nuclear power, oil, natural gas, and renewable
energy sources in a small scale. India’s total domestic
energy production failed to meet its energy consumption.
According to a statistics of 2011, 24.8 % of the coal,
75.0 % of the petroleum, and 24.5 % of the natural gas
consumption in India were imported from other countries.
If the Indian government further increases the scale of
energy import, it would lead to even larger financial
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deficits and deepen the credit crisis of the government. If
power suppliers relay on these costly imported primary
energy sources, it will inevitably create severe financial
losses and even bankruptcy. Consequently, there has been a
lack of motivation for constructing new power plants. As a
result, in early July of each year (before the start of the
rainy season), the power shortage reaches up to 18 %.
Power outages and usage limits become a normal state of
affairs in New Delhi, with some communities even expe-
riencing up to 8 h of power shortage daily.
In 2011, thermal and hydropower plants generated
80.8 % and 14.9 %, respectively, of the total power gen-
eration in India. Coal, natural gas, and diesel power plants
contribute 82 %, 17 %, and 1 % of total thermal power
generation, respectively. The load centers and heavily
populated areas are located in the northern, southern, and
western regions [11]. Accordingly, electric power is
transmitted primarily from the east to the west, and sup-
plemented by north-to-south transmissions. The power
transmission grids of India consist of five regional systems:
the northern grid, eastern grid, northeastern grid, western
grid, and southern grid. The first four systems form an
interconnected wide-area synchronous AC grid. The last
system (i.e., southern grid) is interconnected with the
eastern and western grids via DC transmission lines or
back-to-back DC transmission systems. Overall, the Indian
power system operates in a ‘‘weakly interconnected’’ back-
to-back DC transmission mode similar to that of Japan.
This mode, however, allows only limited power exchange,
thus adversely affecting the level of resource sharing and
emergency assistance. Additionally, because of the lack of
centralized management mechanisms, the coordination for
different responses during accident management is diffi-
cult. Consequently, local accidents can easily result in
large-scale blackouts [3].
3 Inherent factors underlying the massive blackouts
Power system reliability includes two aspects: adequacy
and security [12]. The adequacy of a system reflects its
capability to provide power over various time scales and,
thus, it includes two sub-elements: adequacies in power
generation and transmission. The security reflects the
ability of a power system in tolerating disturbances without
failure. Lack in power generation adequacy, transmission
adequacy, or security could lead to blackouts (local,
regional, or bulk systems).
Routine occurrence of blackouts reveals inherent prob-
lems and structural flaws in the Indian electric power
industry. At a macroscopic level, these include: long-
standing lag in infrastructure development following policy
mistakes (especially the lag in electric power grid
development, lack of strong main grids, and disorganized
management), escalating shortages of available generation
capacity resulting from poor policy reinforcement, severe
congestion of power transmission determined by the
excessive division of administrative systems, and the
conflict between the original intention of excessively
market-oriented structure and the reality of a strong market
influence [13].
As a federal country, the electric power industries of
India are regulated by both the central (i.e., national) and
local (i.e., state) governments. At the national level, the
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. controls the national
power transmission facilities, and it is responsible for the
operation of the centrally-owned power plants and large
independent electric power generation companies. At the
state level, the power department of each state is respon-
sible for the state-owned power plants and independent
power companies in the state, and power distribution is
provided through co-ordination between the state power
department and private power companies. Under this
hierarchical system, the power management of the central
government relies on the chief ministers of individual
states and thus is usually unable to control their local-
interest-oriented behaviors, which are potentially harmful
to the national power system as a whole.
The grid management system of India consists of four
hierarchies: national, regional, state, and local departments.
Each hierarchy represents different interested parties
without effective mechanisms to coordinate them across
hierarchies. This highly divided management results in
poor, inefficient, and even incorrect policies and adminis-
tration. For example, each state conducts its own power
system planning and thus, inevitably, leads to repetitive
facility construction. The focus of the central government
also varies between oil-fired power, nuclear power, and
green energy without a consistent direction. Inevitably, the
outcome of infrastructure investment is poor. In addition,
power management departments frequently yield to polit-
ical pressure to price electricity at abnormally low levels.
Free electricity for farmers provided for irrigation is widely
used for other illegal purposes. The electricity losses in
India are around 24 %–40 % because of network losses
and consumer theft [14].
With the absence of a centralized power management
system, the states frequently disregard orders issued by the
national management department. During normal opera-
tion, individual states operate and compete only according
to local interests, thus preventing improving the overall
efficiency of the grids and even creating overload and other
security risks. In cases of power shortage, individual states
draw power from main grids beyond acceptable limits.
After detecting such overdraw, the national management
center is not permitted to directly intervene and can only
Generalized congestion of power systems 93
123
issue penalty notices via the Central Electricity Regulatory
Commission. Naturally, in cases of emergency, each state
acts according to its own interest without considering the
associated impact on the whole power system. This divided
management system is barely operational even under nor-
mal conditions, and can be expected to be ineffective and
even counter-effective under emergencies. Under this
decentralized management system without central coordi-
nation, it is inevitable that there is no information sharing
system, and thus no security and stability on-line quanti-
tative analysis and control decision support mechanisms.
Consequently, it is impossible to coordinate preventative
controls and emergency controls, let alone self-adaptive
protective actions and periodical on-line refreshing of
response plans for potential accidents. Particularly, during
the restoration control, this scattered regulation system is
not capable of assessing the risk of cascading massive
blackouts, and thus resulted in the second, even larger
blackout on the 31st of July 2012.
From the perspective of grid structure, the power grids
of India lack integrated blackout-defense systems at the top
level, and have no self-adaptive plans for accidents and the
required supporting control mechanisms. The grid opera-
tors also lack awareness of risk management, and pre-
arranged plans to deal with power system blackout.
Therefore, in case of cascading failures (and especially
severe natural disasters), a domino-like power grid collapse
is inevitable. During the subsequent restoration control, the
grids are inherently susceptible to another larger-scale
blackout, as seen on the 31st of July 2012.
The lessons from these two massive blackouts reveal
that the scattered grid management in India’s excessively
privatized environment failed to meet the demands for
electric power brought on through the rapid economic
growth of India. Inappropriate and incorrect policies have
impeded the construction of the required infrastructures,
especially electric power plants and grids. In addition,
various other issues (e.g., primary energy, environmental
factors) have produced generalized congestion, thereby
routinely forcing available generation capacity and trans-
mission capacity into crisis conditions. Even during regular
operation, the grids have been constantly operating with
severe power shortages and thus severely arresting the
economic growth. Arrested economic growth, in turn, has
restrained investment into infrastructure construction, thus
forming a vicious cycle.
Economic systems closely interact with physical systems;
therefore, economics and security should be coordinated
based on risk-management strategies [15]. Without the top-
level design in a strict manner, a private market environment
containing game-playing behaviors of all interested parties
will eventually destroy the security of the power supply. In
2002, India explicitly emphasized the leading roles of
private power companies in power infrastructure construc-
tion and power industry reform. The positive effect of this
excessively privatized mode on the development of power
industry now appears overestimated.
Against this background, power systems constantly
operate under inappropriate conditions. Any initial event
may trigger a domino-like collapse as long as the system
remains operating close to its stability limit. Situations
fueled by human-made errors present an even greater
danger. Given the inherent factors in the Indian power
system, even without the actual trigger of the first massive
blackout (i.e., power line trip), similar massive failures are
bound to occur.
4 Accidental factors in the blackouts
Aside from inherent issues, large disasters are usually
initiated by accidental events which are subsequently
propagated and amplified via a series of cascading failures
and human errors [15]. Although the massive blackouts
hurt the Indian economy, they also revealed the funda-
mental problems in the power system and could serve to
prevent larger disasters in the future. However, if the sys-
tem is left operating at the verge of collapse, its failure may
produce even more devastating effects if triggered (e.g., by
extreme natural disasters). This inference also is true for
other systems, such as the recent rainstorm disaster that
Beijing’s drainage system faced.
These two blackouts are generally believed to be related
to the dry climate, which reduced the hydropower gener-
ation and increased the electricity demand for irrigation.
However, it seems surprising that the failure occurred at
midnight, when the grid load is typically low. One expla-
nation is that, in order to satisfy the residential electricity
demand, the local governments limited industrial power
use before 22:00 p.m., thus turning midnight into a peak
period [16]. If this was true, it would be surprising that the
management departments took no corrective actions even
after emergency measures were over regulated.
5 Caution and enlightenment
For a modern economy, a massive blackout may involve
financial losses exceeding the economic benefits resulting
from market competition. Furthermore, it could even
endanger national and social security. However, on the
positive side, human society develops through surviving
disasters and setbacks, and learning from the two massive
blackouts may help prevent more devastating accidents.
Similar to India, China is a developing country with a large
population and energy demand. Moreover, both countries
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need long-distance high-capacity electric power transmis-
sion because of the mismatch between the locations of
energy sources and load demand. Therefore, the massive
blackouts in India also revealed potentially important and
alarming information for China. The power shortage and
grid structural fragility in the Indian grids can also be found
in the Chinese power system. If China does not reduce its
dependence on fossil fuels, or its power transmission sys-
tem does not comply with the nature of power flow, power
supply may become a major bottleneck for its economic
growth again.
Consistent with experiences from other similar accidents
worldwide, the two massive blackouts revealed critical
information. First, various factors related to the power
transmission system should be reexamined under a unified
framework, including the power industry structure, mar-
keting strategies, regulations, planning and design, simu-
lation, information systems, operation management,
control techniques, R&D investment, and employee train-
ing. Second, the construction of strong smart grids should
be expedited. The planning, construction, management,
and operation of these smart grids must be conducted under
a unified framework. In addition, urban and rural grids,
power transmission and distribution, and grid operation
management must be integrated and controlled by a cen-
tralized agency.
The mechanisms of evolution between the two blackouts
deserve careful attention. Surprisingly, the second blackout
(more massive) appeared when the grids were almost
restored back to normal following the first blackout. The
underlying mechanisms of this failure should be traced and
analyzed. This surprising ‘‘second-wave’’ strike demon-
strated the necessity of a coordinated management system,
and also indicated the importance of an effective coordi-
nation between preventive control, emergency control,
corrective control, and restoration control.
Strong infrastructure facilities usually insure reliable
power supply under normal conditions or general failures.
However, during extreme natural or human-made disasters,
well-designed management and risk-defense systems are
required. If the improvement of the blackout-defense sys-
tem was abandoned, even a highly strong power system can
still become susceptible to failures, as was the case of the
US—Canada 8.14 Blackout [15].
Because of the lack of blackout-defense framework at
the top level, the power system managers failed to take
appropriate measures to stop a domino-like failure at dif-
ferent stages during the evolution of the two blackouts in
India. First, the planning and construction of infrastructure
facilities should insure sufficient generation and transmis-
sion adequacy. Second, smart control is required during the
operation of the system, such as self-adaptive preventive
control for normal operation and self-adaptive emergency
control after responses to failures have been initiated. The
demand-side management should consider both the eco-
nomic performance and the system security. Third, appro-
priate risk awareness must be incorporated in restoration
control to prevent consecutive cascading blackouts.
In addition, the power industry structure and its man-
agement should meet the requirements of economic
growth. Given the complexity of power security, policy
makers should not overemphasize marketization while
neglecting the adverse effects of market-driven competi-
tion, decentralized planning, construction, and manage-
ment on the adequacy and security of power systems.
Although security and economics may seem to conflict,
they are completely united regarding overall economic
performance. Therefore, these two aspects should be
coordinated under the concept of risk management.
The goal of the electricity reform in China is to create a
fair, open, orderly, and competitive electricity market,
thereby optimizing grid regulation, improving the efficiency
of the power industry, and promoting the sustainable
development of the electricity industry. In a competitive
market, the basic role of the power grid is to provide a fair
and open platform. This central task of this platform is to
provide open and unbiased market entrance for market
participants. However, as power transmission and distribu-
tion are naturally monopolized services, simply introducing
market competition to the power networks may not be
practical or economical. Globally, power industry reforms in
many countries were always initiated with high awareness of
the unique techno-economic characteristics of this industry.
Accordingly, the economic gains of reform were achieved
primarily by introducing competition to the power genera-
tion and retail sectors while keeping the power transmission
and distribution sectors regulated by the governments.
Regarding the reform of the power transmission-dis-
tribution services, different countries selected different
reforming models (separated or integrated power genera-
tion and distribution services) according to their own
conditions. Most countries choosing the separated genera-
tion and distribution mode is due to historical reasons. On
the other hand, Russia and some states of Australia swit-
ched to the separate generation and distribution mode as a
result of reform. However, in Russia, after a complete
separation of power sectors (i.e., generation, transmission,
distribution, sales, management, trading) in 2008, the
country recently showed a tendency toward recombining
the power transmission and distribution sectors. After
market-oriented electricity reforms, France, Germany,
Japan, South Korea, and most states (provinces) of the
USA and Canada have decided to keep the original mode
of integrated power transmission and distribution. In the
European Union (EU), the Third EU Energy Legislative
Package requires that, if the power generation and retail
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sectors have been effectively separated, it is not mandatory
to separate other services from power transmission.
Therefore, experiences in other countries or regions indi-
cate that separation of transmission and distribution is not
necessarily the only choice of reform. In fact, the massive
blackouts in India demonstrated that developing countries
typically is experiencing rapid economic changes that
create great uncertainties for their power grids. For these
countries, separated power transmission and distribution
can pose severe risks to their power systems; excessive
marketization is negative to top-level management for
power system’s security; scattered dispatch systems with-
out any coordination mechanisms will fail to handle
emergency accidents.
Compared with the separate model, an integrated power
transmission-distribution network is ideal for optimizing
the planning, construction, and operation of power systems.
This integrated model is also suitable for meeting rapid
growth demands, improving the operation efficiency, and
optimizing resource allocation over the large scale. Even
for developed countries without substantial growth in
power consumption, the integrated model can also con-
tribute to the power system security and disaster prevention
capability.
Market competition is efficient in the power generation
and retail sectors. In comparison, power transmission and
distribution are naturally monopolized services: without
economic conflicts but with similar modes of profit and
regulation methods. Therefore, integrated transmission-
distribution networks can realize strong synergistic effects.
Moreover, during rapid growth of electricity consumption,
an integrated power transmission-distribution network is
compatible with organized planning, construction, and
operation of power systems. These organized activities
allow timely response to the demands of rapid growth,
improve the efficiency of the power systems, and optimize
resource allocation over the large scale. Because of these
obvious advantages, 137 of 150 developing or transition
countries of the world maintain the integrated model. Even
for developed countries with mature power systems which
do not change very often, the integrated model provides
advantages in security and disaster prevention capability.
Clearly, different power transmission-distribution
structures are suitable for different stages of economic
growth. China currently undergoes accelerated urbaniza-
tion and industrialization, and thereby the separation of
transmission and distribution is not an ideal model for the
nation. In fact, the separated model may adversely affect
the coordination of grids and substantially reduce their
resistance to natural disasters and subsequent recovery,
especially when a large amount of renewable energy is
being integrated into the grids. In comparison, the Chinese
power system (an integrated transmission-distribution
system) has maintained a high reliability despite the fact
that its grid is quite weak. During past natural disasters
(e.g., earthquakes, ice storms), the Chinese power system
has gained abundant experiences, both positive and nega-
tive. Therefore, introducing competition via opening power
generation and retail, maintaining integrated transmission-
distribution, and improving the pricing system are the
optimum solution for the Chinese electricity power
industry.
If the emergency management and control strategies in a
power system are independently made by isolated eco-
nomic entities, or closely related controls (preventive,
emergency, corrective, restoration) are performed by sep-
arate departments without global coordination, the power
system control strategies are highly susceptible to disrup-
tion and may even intensify the impact of the initial natural
disaster by manmade errors. The second wave of Indian
blackouts is such a heartbreaking lesson, which is caused
by severe overdraw of power during the restoration process
after the first wave of blackouts on July 30.
6 Efforts of the Chinese electricity industry
in preventing massive blackouts
A strong and smart power system is the basis for power
supply security and disaster prevention, and supports large-
scale power flow transferring and response to severe cas-
cading failures. Accordingly, this requires coordinated grid
planning, construction, management, and operation. It also
demands the integration of power transmission and distri-
bution networks, integration of grid operation manage-
ment, and integration of urban and rural grids.
Based on the experiences of other countries, the Chinese
electricity industry has developed and implemented an
innovative strategy for creating strong smart grids [17].
The strategy involves using ultra-high voltage (UHV) grids
as the backbone structure and emphasizes coordinated
development of grids at various levels. Currently, the
Chinese electricity industry stresses risk evaluation-analy-
sis and management during grid operations, maximizing
the effects of cross-region UHV grids in optimizing energy
allocation, and upgrading demand-side management and
lifecycle equipment management.
China has also innovated and extensively applied com-
prehensive defense techniques against massive blackouts,
which has greatly improved the economy and security of its
power system [18–20]. A Wide-Area Monitoring Analysis
Protection-Control system (WARMAP) with full intellec-
tual property rights has been developed in China and
applied to 4/5 of the provincial and national grids. Efforts
are underway to achieve higher goals, including extending
the range of data collection from the power system to the
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natural environment [21], extending the scope of coordi-
nated control from normal grid conditions to extreme
environments, upgrading the defense strategies from pre-
planned measures to active defense. Through these efforts,
the Chinese power systems expect to achieve coordinated
and optimized comprehensive defense for insuring the
security and stability of bulk power systems and prevent
external disasters or accidental fault from progressing to
power system blackouts [22, 23]. And, building a global
dispatch system is the only way to reach the goal of min-
imizing risks and losses.
7 Strategies for reducing the risk of massive blackouts
The two national power grid corporations (State Grid
Corporation of China and China southern Power Grid) have
been facing various challenges continuously during the
power grid construction process. However, for quite some
time no massive blackouts have occurred in China.
Regardless of the process of future power reform, security
is the top priority for the Chinese power system. Fortu-
nately, as opposed to India, China currently does not face
systematic power shortage. Therefore, the key task facing
the Chinese power system is to optimize the power system
dispatch and comprehensive blackout-defense system. To
accomplish these tasks, many areas of operation should
undergo continuous innovation and improvements, in areas
such as the management structures, infrastructure facilities,
preventive controls, emergency controls, corrective con-
trols, and restoration controls. Furthermore, the macrose-
curity perspective should be created based on the
macroenergy perspective, key issues to be resolved
include: coordinating primary energy with secondary
energy and optimizing energy structures to improve total
energy efficiency and support sustainable development;
coordinating the planning and development among energy
flows comprised of primary energy, generation, transmis-
sion, distribution and consumption; utilizing demand-side
management and energy conservation measures as virtual
generation, transmission and distribution resources; giving
consideration to both real-time, short-time power balance
and long-term reserve problems; studying system stability
and adequacy under different scenarios considering high-
risk events.
Small-probabilistic but high-risk events should be trea-
ted carefully. Although natural disasters are unavoidable,
the influence of human-made errors should not be neglec-
ted [24]. To reduce the high risks associated with small-
probability events, a coordinated time–space comprehen-
sive defense framework must be established from different
dimensions of technology, planning, implementation,
management, and public emergency response etc., focusing
on state repairing, risk identification, information security
and emergency management.
A national emergency-response system should be
developed at the central government level to improve the
ability of the whole society to deal with extreme natural
disasters and human-made accidents.
The construction of UHV-based strong smart grids should
be accelerated based on integrated planning, and the devel-
opment of grids at all levels should be coordinated. In addi-
tion, the evaluation, analysis, and treatment of operational
risks should be improved to maximize the capability of UHV
cross-regional power systems in optimizing energy alloca-
tion. Moreover, the demand-side management and lifecycle
equipment management should also be enhanced.
The grid should constantly improve its time–space
coordinated defense systems against major blackouts. The
risk information collection system should monitor natural
(e.g., meteorological, geological, emergency-response
equipment) and social information. Information systems
should be improved and organized at various levels. These
measures allow security, stability on-line quantitative
analysis and decision-making. Defensive controls should be
pre-planned for various accidents and disasters, and pre-
ventive and emergency controls should be coordinated.
Self-adaptive protective mechanisms should be applied, and
plans against various potential accidents should periodically
be refreshed on-line for multiple time scale and multiple
risk objective decision-making support. These strategies
form comprehensive active defense mechanisms for large
grids, avoiding the risk of power-related disasters.
In addition, safe and reliable equipment is also a key
factor for a strong power grid. Governments should
encourage the power equipment manufacturing industries
to upgrade toward smart, advanced, and integrated manu-
facture via policies related to technology, products, and
supply-chain cooperation. The power industry should pro-
mote the systematic application of equipment to localiza-
tion, thereby increasing the reliability and preventing major
blackouts.
Power systems are among the most complex systems
created by humans, and a completely secure power system
without blackout does not exist. Under compromised con-
ditions, various factors (inadequate information, automa-
tion disruptions, and human-made decision errors) may
create new disturbances to the power systems. Conse-
quently, even a highly strong system could be destroyed
when suffering a series of cascading attacks.
The key point of the problem is that, upon such crisis,
actively ordered small-scale power outages should be ini-
tiated to prevent passive and unordered massive blackout.
Therefore, it is valuable to study how to implement suffi-
cient emergency and corrective controls under various
emergency conditions to prevent subsequent domino-like
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failures. Even impossible to completely prevent accidents,
the power system should take active low-cost actions to
prevent a complete loss of control and thus reduce loss.
The power system is a critical element in the overall
energy system and environmental security. Interactions
between a power system and its external environment are
shown in Fig. 1. It is also closely interconnected to other
external elements. It is essential to maintain a smooth flow
of energy, capital, and information for the power system,
and to control its emission, and thereby to insure power,
energy, and environment security. Consequently, these
objectives are inevitably limited by multiple factors such as
primary energy, pollutant emission, technical support, and
multi-party game-playing.
The power system is intrinsically a monopolized
industry which takes the power market as its mode of
operation. Consequently, regulation is necessary. However,
inappropriate regulation could profoundly damage the
power system. Experimental economic modeling incorpo-
rating physical and economic models are required for
supporting the decisions of regulation policymakers.
The management of the power system requires major
attention. The management department should improve
information mining and publication, establish process
controls based on sufficient information, and allow early
warnings at various time scales. Frequently, the manage-
ment system responds to accidents according to preplanned
strategies while lacking flexibility in dealing with emer-
gencies. It is thus essential to understand the patterns and
mechanisms of the evolution of accidental disorders to
disasters. Correspondingly, based on such understanding,
the management system can automatically switch between
control modes, accomplish the self-organization of func-
tions, and coordinate and optimize responding strategies
during different stages of an accident’s evolution.
The communication network safety and information
reliability have become key issues for the defense system.
It is essential to develop techniques for maintaining core
control when the accident endangers the communication
network itself. Techniques are required for evaluating the
integrity, timeliness, and value of wide-area measurement
and simulation data. It is also necessary to develop analysis
and control techniques for conditions with incomplete
wide-area data. Moreover, it is valuable to develop infor-
mation mining techniques for dynamic wide-area data and
investigate in-depth data processing and effective data
expression.
A strong smart grid is a critical element of a defensive
framework for energy and environmental security [25, 26].
It also expedites and maximizes the integration of renew-
able energies, changes the means of energy transfer, sup-
ports wide-area allocation of energy resources, and
increases the proportion of electricity in final energy con-
sumption. For example, the construction of smart charging
networks for electric vehicles and the changes in the
manner of electricity consumption stimulates the effective
use of clean energies, eventually contributing to energy
conservation and emission reduction.
8 Challenges and missions
The electric power industry plays a key role during the
transition of the energy industry to a sustainable and low-
carbon future. Because of the mismatch between the
locations of energy resources and load demand, a suc-
cessful transition of China’s electric power industry
requires a strong and reliable bulk power grid to optimize
energy resource allocation over the large scale.
The reliability of a power system is affected by distur-
bances from its external sectors. Vice versa, the security
and stability of the power system will also influence these
external sectors. Therefore, it is critical to consider the
interactions between the power system and its external
Physical Power SystemInfrastructure
Development Decision for 
Operating Management
Research & 











Fig. 1 Interactions between a power system and its external environment
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sectors and address the adequacy and security of the
macroenergy system.
The power system management should conform to the
intrinsic requirement of electricity flow (i.e., constant bal-
ance), and correspondingly maintain the management
mechanisms for integrated planning, integrated dispatch,
and coordinated control. Additionally, the electricity
industry should understand the effects of market factors on
power supply reliability, balance security, and economic
performance under the principle of a risk-management
concept.
At the national level, the central government should plan
a global emergency-response system to coordinate the
disaster defense of various sectors. The responsibilities of
various emergency-response departments and their inter-
faces must be clearly defined, and mechanisms must be
established to allow their rapid and coordinated activities.
Importantly, the resistance of the whole society to natural
disaster and human-made accidents should be upgraded.
Information sharing mechanisms are required to allow
effective communication of early warning and information
essential for decision-making between industrial sectors.
The Chinese power system is undergoing strong growth
in power consumption and rapid changes in transmission
and distribution networks. Under these complex conditions,
centralized management, centralized dispatch and an inte-
grated transmission-distribution network are critical for
system security. Division of the power transmission sectors
based on simply following the market rule of other prod-
ucts will create great risks for the system, at least during
the current rapid growth period. At the present stage,
division of electricity transmission and distribution net-
works or centralized dispatch cannot produce economic
benefits, as is clearly indicated by these massive blackouts
in India.
The Chinese electricity industry has created innovative
techniques for quantitative security and stability analysis,
early warning, and decision optimization. The industry has
also developed and successfully applied a blackout-defense
framework. Despite these achievements, the industry
should further enhance its ability to deal with cascading
natural disasters and complicated uncertainties. Impor-
tantly, the industry should establish a more effective
emergency-response system to insure quick, well-orga-
nized, and efficient activities during emergencies.
To continue its success, the Chinese electricity system
should aim to achieve a series of higher goals. It should
extend the wide-area data collection from the electricity
system alone to include natural and social sectors. Thus, it
can provide opportunities for forecasting accidents (e.g.,
hail, typhoons, lightning), foreseeing changes in primary
energy and environmental conditions, and allow more time
for response planning, material allocation, and the
arranging of repair forces. Moreover, the system should
allow dynamic evaluation of the risks in the communica-
tion networks (both the electricity system and the public
communication system) and their potential impacts on its
blackout defense. It should extend the range of effective
early warning from minutes to hours and increase the
number of early warning targets from single failure risks to
cascading failures risks. The system should adopt self-
adaptive decision-making strategies to minimize the scale
of power outages, as well as the duration (via restoration
control [27]). Finally, it should prevent small-probabilistic
events from progressing into large-area public crises and
promote restoration of services through appropriate emer-
gency responses.
9 Conclusion
Malicious pleasure and naive optimism are unwise
attitudes toward the massive blackouts in India. The sce-
narios during those blackouts should be investigated and
the management system and blackout defense of the Chi-
nese power system should be correspondingly analyzed.
Experiences from the massive blackouts can improve
confidence in the Chinese power system but also reveal
weakness in that system. In fact, the experiences show that
the Chinese power system also has substantial risks in
infrastructure facilities, management structure, and emer-
gency responses. It indicates that the Chinese electricity
industry should upgrade its performance and reliability
through constant innovation. Learning from these experi-
ences may provide valuable insights for security and
healthy development of the Chinese electricity industry as
well as the whole Chinese economy.
Comprehensive defense of high risks associated with
small-probability accidents must conform to the principle
of a united overall energy system [9]. A coordinated multi-
dimensional time–space comprehensive defense frame-
work must be undertaken using a variety of aspects such as
technology, planning, implementation, management, and
public crisis response preparation. The traditional but
effective strategy of ‘‘three-defense-lines’’ should be
extended to insure effective and coordinated control of
small-probability but high-risk emergency events.
China is constructing strong smart grids, promoting the
use of distributed generation, and encouraging electricity
storage and micro-grid development. The Chinese elec-
tricity system is on the way of improving the adequacy and
security of information input, insuring the robustness of
decisions, and supporting the availability of output infor-
mation and transparency of disaster information. The sys-
tem is also developing mechanisms for automatic on-line
preplan refreshing to insure organized responses after
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emergencies, thereby effectively controlling small-proba-
bility high risks events and insuring power supply for
critical load demands under extreme disasters.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
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